Fertility decline and the changing dynamics of wealth, status and inequality by Colleran, Heidi et al.
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.orgResearch
Cite this article: Colleran H, Jasienska G,
Nenko I, Galbarczyk A, Mace R. 2015 Fertility
decline and the changing dynamics of wealth,
status and inequality. Proc. R. Soc. B 282:
20150287.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.0287Received: 9 February 2015
Accepted: 11 March 2015Subject Areas:
behaviour, ecology, evolution
Keywords:
fertility decline, wealth, status, inequality,
demographic transitionAuthor for correspondence:
Heidi Colleran
e-mail: heidi.colleran@iast.frElectronic supplementary material is available
at http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rspb.2015.0287 or
via http://rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org.
& 2015 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted use, provided the original
author and source are credited.Fertility decline and the changing
dynamics of wealth, status and inequality
Heidi Colleran1,3, Grazyna Jasienska2, Ilona Nenko2, Andrzej Galbarczyk2
and Ruth Mace3
1Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse 31015, France
2Department of Environmental Health, Jagiellonian University Medical College, Krakow 31-531, Poland
3Department of Anthropology, University College London, London WC1H 0BW, UK
In the course of demographic transitions (DTs), two large-scale trends become
apparent: (i) the broadly positive association between wealth, status and ferti-
lity tends to reverse, and (ii) wealth inequalities increase and then temporarily
decrease. We argue that these two broad patterns are linked, through a diver-
sification of reproductive strategies that subsequently converge as populations
consume more, become less self-sufficient and increasingly depend on edu-
cation as a route to socio-economic status. We examine these links using
data from 22 mid-transition communities in rural Poland. We identify chan-
ging relationships between fertility and multiple measures of wealth, status
and inequality. Wealth and status generally have opposing effects on fertility,
but these associations vary by community. Where farming remains a viable
livelihood, reproductive strategies typical of both pre- and post-DT popu-
lations coexist. Fertility is lower and less variable in communities with lower
wealth inequality, and macro-level patterns in inequality are generally repro-
duced at the community level. Our results provide a detailed insight into
the changing dynamics of wealth, status and inequality that accompany DTs
at the community level where peoples’ social and economic interactions
typically take place. We find no evidence to suggest that women with the
most educational capital gain wealth advantages from reducing fertility,
nor that higher educational capital delays the onset of childbearing in this
population. Rather, these patterns reflect changing reproductive preferences
during a period of profound economic and social change, with implications
for our understanding of reproductive and socio-economic inequalities in
transitioning populations.1. Introduction
The dramatic fertility declines that accompany transitions from subsistence farming
to a market economy are typified by two important large-scale patterns: (i) an appar-
ent reversal or dampening of the broadly positive association between wealth, status
and fertility [1–3]; and (ii) a short-term reversal in trends in inequality [4–8]. Prior to
the demographic transition (DT), wealthy and high status people typically have
higher fertility than poorer and lower status people [9–15], though some historical
evidence suggests that this relationship is not so straightforward [16,17]. Wealth
inequality is moderately high [14,18–21] compared with hunter–gatherers. In trans-
itioning and post-DT populations, by contrast, wealthy and high status people
typically have lower fertility than poorer and lower status people [1,3] and wealth
inequality is temporarily lower than in pre-DT contexts [4,6,14].
Despite extensive research on how wealth and status influence fertility, there
is little agreement about how these two broad reversals occur, or how they may be
connected. Many studies focus on either pre-DT [3,9–12,15,22–24] or post-DT
populations [1,25–29], where the measures of wealth and status—and the cultural
and economic contexts in which they matter—differ dramatically. This heterogen-
eity makes it difficult to compare the magnitude and variation of effects across
study sites [30], or to identify points on a continuum of change [3]. More detailed
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2comparative studies are needed in transitioning populations,
where both ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ forms of wealth and
status influence fertility. Changing relationships can then be
demonstrated [14,30,31]. However, few studies have compared
wealth and status effects on fertility in multiple local contexts
[14,32,33], rather than across regions [3,34,35] or countries
[3,21,25,27]. Fewer still have examined how interactions
between different measures may produce context-dependent
reproductive outcomes [27,31,35]. Moreover, little is known
about how wealth and status inequality varies on the continuum
of economic modernization [3,36–38], or indeed, how inequality
relates to fertility in mid-transitional contexts [14,37,39].
At a macro-level, contemporary fertility declines and both
income inequality and economic growth are strongly associated
with the accumulation of educational capital [4–6,38–40]. Kuz-
nets hypothesized [6] that income inequality increases and then
decreases in the course of market integration. This pattern, he
argued, emerged purely as a function of underlying structural
change—the declining importance of the farming sector and
increasing importance of formal schooling—in a shift that
increases average income as ever-larger shares of the popu-
lation embrace market-labour over subsistence farming.
Although inequality increases again in late capitalist societies
[8,41], macro-level evidence suggests that income inequality
generally decreases as fertility declines [5,37] and as average
income increases ([5,7], though see [8]). There are little data to
support these patterns at lower levels of aggregation, where
peoples’ social and economic interactions typically take place
[14,36]. Yet local contexts should shape reproductive decisions
more than should higher-level aggregates [42], because local
distributions of resources and opportunities govern what econ-
omic activities are possible, and because local social interactions
constrain and facilitate acceptable behaviour [43,44]. Increas-
ingly, status competition is thought to occur within rather
than between social strata and regions [25,35,45,46]. This
makes it important to examine wealth and status effects on
fertility relative to local, rather than absolute aggregates.
Since macro-level patterns are often used to infer individual
decision-mechanisms, we should also learn whether local
patterns and inequalities reproduce macro-level ones.
And yet the meanings of wealth and status—not only
the effects—are in flux during the course of market integration,
as they are in other subsistence transitions [18–21,47,48]. As
hunter–gatherers transition to agriculture, the primacy of
‘embodied’ capital in the form of physical size, local knowledge,
hunting and fighting skill appears to give way to multiple
dimensions of ‘extrasomatic’ capital, such as land, livestock
and material assets [20,21,49,50], which positively correlate
with fertility [9–13,32]. By contrast, transitioning and post-DT
populations are typified by the re-emergence of embodied capi-
tal in the form of education, skill accumulation and occupational
status as central to socio-economic [38] but not, apparently,
reproductive success [49,50]. Definitions of wealth and status
vary [9,29,48,49,51], but in evolutionary anthropology, wealth
is probably most often understood as ‘resources’ and status as
‘access to resources’ [26,27,29,34,51]. This dichotomy is useful
because of its general applicability across contexts (and species)
and because it aids in the development of causal hypotheses:
we expect status differentials to determine how wealth affects
fertility, rather than the other way around.
We argue that as subsistence farmers transition to a market
economy, wealth and status become decoupled in their effects
on fertility, allowing variation in reproductive strategies toemerge alongside new forms of status stratification. Couples
abandoning farming for market-oriented employment receive
an economic and a demographic dividend. By increasing
labour-force participation, non-farming income is increased,
permitting investments in educational capital, savings and
other assets, generating marginal advantages in the market
economy [38], even for couples who are not educated them-
selves. And because market-integrated couples may not need
(or want) large families, resources are diluted among fewer
people. This mirrors a macro-level pattern whereby fertility
declines temporarily change the age-structure of a population,
allowing for periods of rapid economic growth [41,52]. Farmers
who diversify their income sources by having family members
in the labour market may still need (or want) more children,
so they experience greater dilution of their market-related
resources. Small reproductive and income differentials can mag-
nify inequalities between non-farming and farming households.
If couples marry assortatively according to education or earning
potential, these inequalities will be further magnified [41].
As populations consume more, become less self-sufficient
and increasingly rely on education as the main route to socio-
economic status, convergence on a single reproductive strategy
is driven by a range of interrelated mechanisms that change par-
ental investment strategies [53,54] and reproductive priorities.
These include declining demand for children as economic contri-
butors [55,56], opportunities for upward social mobility [14,57]
and exposure to new cultural norms or lifestyles that promote
cultural goals at the expense of reproductive ones [43,58–60].
In previous work, we found that with a critical mass of educated
women in a community, less-educated women are converging
on low fertility preferences [43]. Here, we examine whether mul-
tiple reproductive strategies coexist in less market-oriented
communities, and if macro-level patterns in inequality are repro-
duced at sociallyand economically relevant levels of aggregation.
We test seven hypotheses designed to examine how wealth
and status change in their effects on fertility, and whether this
is associated with changing levels of inequality. First, if wealth
and status become decoupled during market integration, then
(i) they should have different effects on fertility. If reproductive
stratification is driven by differences in educational capital,
then (ii) educational capital should moderate how wealth influ-
ences fertility. This moderating effect should itself depend on
how market-oriented the community is, and since convergence
on low fertility is already underway in more highly educated
communities [43], we expect (iii) reproductive strategies to vary
more where farming remains a viable alternative to the labour
market. Then, if converging reproductive strategies drive
reductions in wealth inequality, (iv) fertility should vary less
and (v) average fertility should be lower in more equal commu-
nities. Finally, if community-level inequalities reliably reproduce
macro-level patterns, then (vi) wealthier, more educated and
market-integrated communities should be less unequal and
(vii) communities with more equal distributions of market
integration and wealth should have higher educational capital.
Our data come from a randomized study of 1995 women
aged 18–91 living in 22 communities (21 villages and 1 town,
see electronic supplementary material, table S1) in rural
Poland. Data were collected between 2009 and 2010. The area
is characterized by centuries of peasant subsistence farming.
It is now rapidly becoming dependent on labour-market
income [61,62], following Poland’s rapid transition to a market
economy in the early 1990s and accession to the EU in
2004. More than 65% (n¼ 1255) of our respondents live in
Table 1. Description of the variables used to develop the four wealth and status measures.
principal component variable name variable description mean s.d.
factor
loading
farming wealth total land total land (in hectares) 2.23 2.75 0.78
cows total number cows 0.79 1.83 0.76
bulls total number bulls 0.16 0.76 0.67
tractor (yes; no) household owns a tractor 0.44 0.50 0.59
combine (yes; no) household owns a combine harvester 0.04 0.19 0.56
non-farming wealth computer (yes; no) computer in the house 0.82 0.38 0.81
internet (yes; no) Internet connection in the house 0.74 0.44 0.81
car (yes; no) car in the household 0.86 0.34 0.60
total rooms total number of rooms 4.59 1.78 0.54
satellite TV (yes; no) satellite TV in the house 0.70 0.46 0.47
total household monthly income mean income in the house 20.01 0.29 0.45
educational capital mother’s education mother’s highest educational level 2.53 0.96 0.83
father’s education father’s highest educational level 2.45 0.85 0.80
respondent education respondent’s highest educational level 3.54 0.97 0.74
mother ever worked (yes; no) mother ever engaged in paid work 0.57 0.50 0.68
father ever worked (yes; no) father ever engaged in paid work 0.80 0.40 0.62
wage income in childhood (yes; no) parental income source in childhood 0.33 0.47 0.60
any holiday (yes; no) family has ever been on holiday 0.56 0.50 0.36
Cronbach’s a ¼ 0.57 for ‘Farming wealth’, a ¼ 0.70 for ‘Non-farming wealth’, a ¼ 0.82 for ‘Educational capital’
composite variable variables used variable description (weight given)
market integration current occupation categories farmer (1); full (2)/part-time (2)/seasonal (1) employed; unemployed/jobseeker (1);
housewife/child-minder/maternity leave (1); pensioner/receiving state benefits
(1); full time student (1); dependent (0)
occupational status categories specialist/manager (3); qualified white-collar (3); unqualified white-collar (2);
qualified blue-collar (2); unqualified blue-collar (1)
ever employed (yes; no) individual had ever been employed; yes (1); no (0)
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
Proc.R.Soc.B
282:20150287
3
households partly or mainly subsisting from farming, but only
approximately 4% of households exclusively farm. Income-
generating strategies combine farm and off-farm work, formal
and informal wage-labour, allowing us to examine both ‘tra-
ditional’ and ‘modern’ dimensions of wealth and status. These
communities are undergoing late-stage DT, and fertility is
declining. Nonetheless, completed fertility in our sample is
dramatically higher than Polish national estimates (total fertility
rate (TFR) of 1.38 in 2010, TFR of 2.16 in 1949, the most represen-
tative birth cohort), with a mean of 3.81 (s.d. 2.15) children per
woman, and significant between-community variation [43].2. Material and methods
(a) Measures of wealth and status
We develop four separate, largely orthogonal measures of
wealth and status: (1) ‘farming wealth’, (2) ‘non-farming wealth’,
(3) women’s ‘educational capital’ and (4) household ‘market
integration’ (table 1; electronic supplementary material). We con-
ceptualize educational capital and market integration as status
measures because they determine access to employment opportu-
nities and resources in market economies, as well as exposure to
non-traditional norms and values. We conceptualize wealth as the
resources themselves. Measures (1)–(3) were obtained fromprincipal component analysis (PCA), allowing us to reduce a
set of candidate variables to parsimonious orthogonal ‘latent’
dimensions in the data (electronic supplementary material).
Market integration is a weighted composite index of occupation,
occupational prestige and employment history, averaged across
up to 15 householders. All four measures are continuous and
standardized to have a mean of 0 and s.d. of 1.
Our measures capture detailed variation in the proxies of
wealth and status. Educational capital incorporates both parental
and individual education, and thus intergenerational transmission
of socio-economic status, making it a good proxy for ‘embodied’
capital. Market integration incorporates occupational status and
both formal and informal employment, reflecting the diversity of
income-generating strategies in this population. Our measures have
significant advantages over using multiple predictors measured on
different scales, including better handling of inter-correlation, more
parsimonious statistical modelling and direct comparability of
effect sizes on fertility, both within and between communities.
We describe inequality in each of our four measures
using Gini coefficients, calculated across the whole sample and
disaggregated by community.
(b) Statistical analysis
We use multi-level Poisson regression [63] to examine wealth and
status associations with fertility (number of live births) in our
22 study communities, net of controls (age, age2, experience of
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Figure 1. Between-community variation in the associations between fertility (using a log link) and (a) educational capital, (b) market integration, (c) non-farming
wealth and (d ) farming wealth. Each line represents the model-adjusted regression of each measure on fertility in each community (n ¼ 1972). Dashed black lines
represent the fixed effect of each measure overall. Every unit on the x-axis corresponds to 1 s.d. in the predictor variable; all four measures are centred on zero.
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under-five mortality (approx. 3% of women) and farmer status
(fertility and farming wealth are higher among farmers)). We
include random intercepts at the community and individual
levels to account for unobserved heterogeneity at each level of
analysis [63]. Twenty-three women living outside the study
communities were excluded, leaving a sample size of n ¼ 1972.
We allow both the slopes and intercepts of our wealth and
status measures to vary by community, constituting a conserva-
tive test of the hypothesis that they are associated with fertility
overall (electronic supplementary material). Completed fertility
differs significantly between our study communities [43], and
our interest is in how relative, rather than absolute wealth
and status differentials might drive this variation. We therefore
group-mean centred our predictors, transforming an individual’s
score into her deviation from the community mean. This removes
the partial correlation between individual- and community-
level effects, which is essential for contextual modelling [64].
Group-centring neither substantively affects the results (electronic
supplementary material, table S4) nor creates artificial differences
between communities (electronic supplement material, figures S1
and S2), and the community means are included in the
model. All analyses were carried out in R v. 14.2 (electronic
supplementary material).3. Results
(a) Associations between wealth, status and fertility
(i) Wealth and status have opposing effects on fertility, and these vary
by community. Figure 1 shows that educational capital andmarket integration are generally negatively associated with
fertility, whereas farming and non-farming wealth are gener-
ally positively associated with fertility. When only fixed
effects are considered (dashed black lines), all of the associ-
ations are significant. However, allowing the slopes to vary
by community reveals associations that differ and are not
always significant (coloured lines).
Educational capital has the largest fixed effect on fertility.
A 1 s.d. increase is associated with a 7% reduction in fertility
(eb ¼ 0.93, b ¼ 20.08, 95% CI(b) [20.14, 20.02] (b, regression
coefficient; CI, confidence interval)). The distribution spans
approximately 5.3 s.d., so women with the most educational
capital were predicted to have approximately 35% (i.e. 1-e5.3b)
fewer children than women with the least. But depending on
the community, a 1 s.d. increase predicted anywhere from a
20% decrease (eb ¼ 0.80, b ¼ 20.23, 95% CI(b) [20.32,
20.14]) to a 13% increase (eb ¼ 1.13, b ¼ 0.12, 95% CI(b)
[0.01, 0.24]) in fertility. Thus, when considered across the
range in a particular community (electronic supplementary
material, figure S1), women with the most educational capital
are predicted to have from approximately 60% fewer to
approximately 54% more children than women with the least
educational capital.
Similarly, a 1 s.d. increase in market integration is associ-
ated with a 5% decrease in fertility overall (eb ¼ 0.95,
b ¼ 20.05, 95% CI(b) [20.08, 20.01]), translating into approxi-
mately 24% lower fertility among the most market-integrated
households compared with the least (the range spans approx.
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Figure 2. (a) The ( fixed effect) interaction between non-farming wealth and fertility, for deciles on the scale of educational capital. The top (solid black) line
illustrates the positive association between wealth and fertility for women with the lowest educational capital. The bottom (light blue) line illustrates the negative
association between wealth and fertility for women with the highest educational capital. Each unit on the x-axis corresponds to 1 s.d. in non-farming wealth.
(b) The interaction is stronger (i.e. more negative) in communities with more (i) farmers and (ii) exclusive farmers, and in communities with (iii) low mean
educational capital and (iv) high mean farming wealth. The interaction is not always significant: red points indicate where the 95% CIs do not include zero.
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5.5 s.d.). This varies across communities from a 2% (eb ¼ 0.98,
b ¼ 20.02, 95% CI(b) [20.05, 0.00]) to an 8% (eb ¼ 0.92,
b ¼ 20.09, 95% CI(b) [20.12, 20.05]) decrease in fertility or
a difference of between 9 and 20% fewer children among
women in the most market-integrated households compared
with those in the least market-integrated ones.
A 1 s.d. increase in non-farming wealth is associated with
a 3% increase in fertility overall (eb ¼ 1.03, b ¼ 0.03, 95%
CI(b) [20.01, 0.08]), and therefore, approximately 20%
higher predicted fertility among the wealthiest women com-
pared with the least wealthy (the range spans approx.
6 s.d.). This varies across communities from an 11% increase
(eb ¼ 1.11, b ¼ 0.10, 95% CI(b) [0.03, 0.17]) to a 5% decrease
(eb ¼ 0.95, b ¼ 20.05, 95% CI(b) [20.10, 0.00]) in fertility,
and thus a difference of between 55% more and 22% fewer
children among women with the highest levels of non-farm-
ing wealth relative to the least wealthy women.
A 1 s.d. increase in farming wealth is associated with a 5%
increase in fertility overall (eb ¼ 1.05, b ¼ 0.05, 95% CI(b) [0.02,
0.08]) and therefore approximately 65% higher predicted ferti-
lity among the wealthiest women compared with the least
wealthy women (the range spans approx. 10 s.d.). This varies
across communities from a 1% (eb ¼ 1.01, b ¼ 0.01, 95%
CI(b) [20.01, 0.03]) to an 8% (eb ¼ 1.08, b ¼ 0.07, 95% CI(b)
[0.06, 0.09]) increase in fertility. The most traditionally wealthy
women are predicted to have between 5 and 34% more children
than the least wealthy women in their community.
These results show that the magnitude and sometimes
the direction of these effects on fertility depend on the
local context in which women reproduce, and imply
non-trivial fertility differentials. Nonetheless, a significant
interaction between non-farming wealth and educational
capital (figure 2a) means that these effects should not be
understood in isolation.
(ii) Educational capital modifies the effect of non-farming
wealth on fertility. Figure 2a shows that overall, non-farmingwealth is positively associated with fertility when educational
capital is low (top black line), but negatively associated with
fertility when educational capital is high (bottom blue line).
A 1 s.d. increase in a woman’s educational capital is associated
with a 4% decrease in the magnitude of the positive relation-
ship between non-farming wealth and fertility (eb ¼ 0.96,
b ¼ 20.04, 95% CI(b) [20.08, 20.01]). Women with higher
educational capital are therefore predicted to reduce fertility
with increasing wealth, whereas women with lower edu-
cational capital are predicted to increase fertility with
increasing wealth. However, the interaction itself varies by
community and is not always significant (figure 2b). A 1 s.d.
increase in educational capital is associated with anywhere
from a 3% increase (eb ¼ 1.03, b ¼ 0.03, 95% CI(b) [20.02,
0.08]) to a 13% decrease (eb ¼ 0.87, b ¼ 20.14, 95% CI(b)
[20.20, 20.09]) in the magnitude of the positive relationship
between non-farming wealth and fertility.
(iii) Diverging reproductive strategies are more evident where
farming is viable. Figure 2b shows that the interaction above
tends to be stronger (i.e. more negative) and more often statisti-
cally significant within communities with a high proportion of
farmers (usually more than 60%, Pearson’s R ¼ 20.38, p ¼
0.093) and exclusive farmers (R ¼ 20.44, p ¼ 0.043), and in
communities with higher mean farming wealth (R ¼ 20.47,
p ¼ 0.026) and lower mean educational capital (R ¼ 0.42, p ¼
0.050). Thus, where farming livelihoods are viable, repro-
ductive strategies are more variable. The interaction is not
related to community sample size (R ¼ 0.017, p ¼ 0.939), nor
to population density (R ¼ 0.051, p ¼ 0.822).
We examined whether educational capital drives post-
ponement of reproduction, either as a strategy to increase
wealth among highly educated women [35], or because of a
trade-off between education and early childbearing [65]. We
do not find support for either of these hypotheses. Women
in the top quartile of educational capital do not have signifi-
cantly later ages at first birth (AFB), either when pooling all
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Figure 3. (a) Variation in predicted fertility (measured in s.d.) in lower in communities with lower inequality in non-farming wealth. Mean predicted fertility in the
community (+s.e. in the prediction) is also lower in communities with lower inequality in (b) market integration and (c) non-farming wealth. Inequality in (d )
market integration and (e) non-farming wealth declines as the mean in the community increases. ( f ) Mean educational capital is higher in communities where
inequality in market integration is lower. Each bar in (d ) – ( f ) represents a Gini coefficient in a particular community, shown as a deviation from the overall Gini
coefficient for that measure (horizontal line). Communities are ordered from left to right in terms of increasing mean (d ) market integration (e) non-farming wealth
and ( f ) educational capital.
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age-groups (F ¼ 1.21, p ¼ 0.304, mean AFB ¼ 23.76+3.83),
or considering only post-reproductive women (F ¼ 1.43, p ¼
0.232), and the top quartiles are not significantly different
across communities (F ¼ 1.09, p ¼ 0.297). Women in the
top quartile of educational capital do not differ in levels
of non-farming wealth, either across the sample (F ¼ 0.45,
p ¼ 0.720) or across communities (F ¼ 1.13, p ¼ 0.287),
although they exhibit significantly less variance in wealth
(Browne–Forsythe F ¼ 24.81, p , 0.001) and are substantially
more market-integrated (F ¼ 77.69, p , 0.001). Instead,
post-reproductive women in the top quartile of educa-
tional capital have significantly shorter reproductive spans
(F ¼ 13.35, p , 0.001), indicating that later fertility regulation
within marriage, rather than postponement of early reproduc-
tion, drives the patterns in our data. Neither the main effect of
educational capital, nor its interaction with non-farming
wealth, is driven by the inclusion of childless women in
our sample (electronic supplement material, tables S5–S6),
contrary to what has been found in other studies [26,27].(b) Wealth and status inequality
Overall, inequality across the sample is relatively low, with
Gini coefficients of 0.23 for educational capital, 0.21 for
market integration, and 0.16 for non-farming wealth. Farming
wealth has a higher Gini coefficient of 0.42 (measuring only
farmers). However, inequality varies substantially across com-
munities. Gini coefficients for educational capital vary from
0.13 to 0.26, indicating twice the amount of inequality insome communities compared with others. Gini coefficients
for market integration vary from 0.08 to 0.41, and those for
non-farming wealth vary from 0.06 to 0.27, in both cases indi-
cating up to five times more inequality in some communities
compared with others. Coefficients for farming wealth vary
from 0.05 to 0.56, indicating ten times the amount of inequality
in the most unequal community compared with the most equal
one. Gini coefficients for different measures are not signifi-
cantly inter-correlated (electronic supplementary material,
table S2c), so inequality on one dimension does not imply
inequality on others. Inequality is also unrelated to population
density or sample size (electronic supplementary material,
table S2d).
(iv–v) Fertility is higher and more varied in unequal commu-
nities. We examined correlations between community-level
Gini coefficients and the community-averaged fitted scores
from the multi-level model (adjusted means and s.d. of
predicted fertility). Figure 3a shows that there is significantly
less variation in predicted fertility (measured in s.d.) in com-
munities with lower inequality in non-farming wealth (R ¼
0.58, p ¼ 0.004), but variation in fertility is not related to
other forms of inequality. Figure 3b,c show respectively that
mean predicted fertility is also significantly lower in commu-
nities with lower inequality in both market integration (R ¼
0.47, p ¼ 0.027) and non-farming wealth (R ¼ 0.65, p ¼
0.001), but is not related to inequality in educational capital.
Declining inequality in wealth and market integration is there-
fore related to convergence on low fertility strategies, but not all
kinds of inequality are equally important.
rspb.royalsocietypublishing.org
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7(vi–vii) Community-level inequality reproduces macro-level
patterns. Finally, community-level inequalities reproduce
macro-level patterns for some measures. Figure 3d,e show
respectively a clear decline in inequality in both market inte-
gration (R ¼ 20.85, p , 0.001) and non-farming wealth
(R ¼ 20.87, p , 0.001) in communities where the mean is
higher. However, inequality in educational capital and farming
wealth is not related to the means of those measures. Figure 3f
also confirms that in communities where inequality in market
integration is lower, mean educational capital is significantly
higher (R ¼ 20.57, p ¼ 0.005, [the outlier in figure 3f is the
community with the smallest sample size of n ¼ 11]). This
last result is not driven by in-migration of highly educated
people into more market-integrated communities. The pro-
portion of migrants in the community is unrelated to
inequality in market integration (R ¼ 0.143, p ¼ 0.526) and
migrants are not more highly educated than non-migrants
(t ¼ 0.122, p ¼ 0.903).1502874. Discussion
Transitions from hunting and gathering to subsistence agricul-
ture appear typified by a diversification in the types of wealth
and status that are inherited, and by increasing reliance on
‘extrasomatic’ over ‘embodied’ capital [20,21]. By contrast,
contemporary transitions to market economies seem typified
by the re-emergence of embodied forms of capital as central
to socio-economic [38], but not necessarily reproductive suc-
cess [66,67]. Demographic transitions can therefore be
conceptualized as transitions in the nature and effects of
wealth and status. The diversification of reproductive strategies
that these changes allow may drive increases in inequality.
Convergence on low fertility may then temporarily reduce
these inequalities. We demonstrate connections between the
two broad reversals that tend to characterize contemporary
DTs to low fertility, at a level of aggregation that captures the
social and economic contexts people actually live in. Our
results provide a rarely available insight into the changing
dynamics of wealth, status and inequality in one of the few
European regions where this change is still ongoing.
We find that wealth and status have different effects on fer-
tility, but the associations vary by community, and they interact
in certain contexts to produce patterns typical of both pre- and
post-DT populations. In this mid-transition context, wealthy
women with higher levels of educational capital—a form of
status that itself emerges and becomes important during econ-
omic development—have fewer children, whereas wealthy
women with lower educational capital have more children.
These are not simply differences in fertility outcomes between
high- and low-status individuals, but imply different repro-
ductive strategies, i.e. the use of resources to maximize
different fitness currencies [68]. These different reproductive
strategies coexist in communities where farming remains an
important livelihood.
Women in the top quartile of educational capital were
neither more likely to postpone the start of their reproductive
careers, nor more materially wealthy, than their counterparts
in lower quartiles, either across communities or as a whole.
So fertility reduction does not appear to be an unambiguous
strategy for acquiring material advantages early in life,
although women in the top quartile of educational capital
do exhibit less variance in wealth. Rather, fertility reductionappears driven by reproductive choices after the onset of
childbearing. This may have more to do with changing pre-
ferences over the course of the reproductive career than
with fundamental energetic trade-offs at the onset of repro-
duction: it may also be related to time constraints owing to
workforce participation at later life stages. These results
contrast with recent evidence that low fertility, high educa-
ted women have wealth advantages [35], and that early
childbearing impedes educational attainment [65].
In line with macro-level and some historical evidence
[5,14,39], fertility decline in this population is associated
with declining inequality in wealth and market integration,
but not with declining inequality in educational capital.
This is broadly consistent with a ‘Kuznetz curve’ such that
inequality has an inverted U-shaped relationship with aver-
age income [4]. This could be driven by the rapid
abandonment of farming [61], but is also consistent with
the diffusion of knowledge and values that alter reproductive
preferences in a way that may causally influence economic
behaviour [8,43,58]. Our analyses certainly support the
assumption that more equality in market integration is
related to the accumulation of educational capital [5,39]. So
why was inequality in educational capital unimportant for
predicting fertility decline? The answer lies partly in the
fact that market engagement in this population is not depen-
dent on high levels of education, as informal and migrant
wage-labour, and to a lesser extent, seasonal cash cropping,
can generate significant financial returns for less-educated
households. This explains why women with the highest
educational capital, while more market integrated, were not
necessarily wealthier. But also, as we have previously shown,
less-educated women appear to adopt the reproductive strat-
egies of their peers, given a critical mass of highly educated
women in the community, so individual-level variation in
education does not necessarily track variation in fertility [43].
Until recently, this largely self-sufficient economy was reli-
ant on cooperative farm work and childcare [61,62]. With the
diminishment of farming [61], reproductive strategies are con-
verging on the solution we now see in the majority of the
world’s populations [43]. Our results capture reproductive
stratification alongside new kinds of status stratification,
but the effects of wealth and status on fertility should not be
considered in isolation. We expect similar interactions to exist
in other transitioning populations, and cross-cultural work
could establish whether they are a general feature of socio-
economic stratification. A simple dichotomy between wealth
(understood as resources) and status (understood as access to
resources) is useful for generalizing across populations and
for generating causal hypotheses. We have argued that status
differentials drive the changing relationship between wealth
and fertility, but wealth and status are not independent;
there will undoubtedly be important feedback between them.
However, diverging reproductive strategies that magnify
differentials between farmers and non-farmers may drive
increases in wealth inequality. This diversification, and its sub-
sequent convergence, may be a central mechanism in the
changing inequalities that accompany the later stages of
contemporary DTs, as economic growth takes off.
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